Epic Games vs Apple: The App Store Antitrust Battle 🎮🍏

Executive Summary: Epic Games sued Apple in 2020 over the iOS App Store rules, igniting a high-stakes antitrust battle. Epic’s Fortnite had challenged Apple’s 30% in-app fee and anti-steering policies by adding its own payment system on August 13, 2020【33†L153-L161】. Apple promptly removed Fortnite, and Epic filed suit, claiming Apple unlawfully monopolized the iOS market. In September 2021, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers largely sided with Apple: Epic’s Sherman Act claims failed, but Apple’s anti-steering rule (banning links to external payments) violated California law. The court enjoined Apple from enforcing anti-steering on developers. On appeal in April 2023 the Ninth Circuit upheld most rulings, including the injunction allowing developers to link out, while agreeing Epic proved no valid antitrust market【48†L117-L125】. The U.S. Supreme Court denied review in January 2024, solidifying the lower-court outcome.

Subsequently Apple revised its App Store in January 2024 to permit external purchase links but still charge a 27% commission on linked sales within 7 days. Epic accused Apple of defying the injunction by imposing this fee and filed for contempt. In April 2025 Judge Rogers again ruled for Epic, barring Apple from collecting fees on outside purchases and from limiting developers’ calls-to-action. Apple’s emergency appeal to pause these reforms was denied (June 2025).

Globally, regulatory and legal actions have mirrored this fight. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (effective March 2024) forced Apple to allow sideloading and external payments, and in June 2024 the European Commission preliminarily found Apple’s App Store rules (including steering bans and a “core technology fee”) violate EU law. In the U.S., the DOJ sued Apple for monopolizing smartphones in March 2024. Many developers and experts cite Epic v. Apple as shaping platform economics: it underscores the dynamics of two-sided markets, where restrictions on developers ripple to consumers.

Key Takeaways:

• Epic triggered the case on Aug 13, 2020 by bypassing Apple’s payment system in Fortnite. Apple removed Fortnite, Epic sued.
• Epic’s lawsuit (filed Aug 2020) asserted Apple’s App Store restrictions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act (§1 tying, §2 monopoly), California’s Cartwright Act, and the state Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Apple counterclaimed breach of contract.
• The May–June 2021 bench trial led to a Sept 10, 2021 ruling: Apple won 9 of 10 counts (no antitrust violation), but lost on the UCL count. Judge Rogers enjoined Apple’s anti-steering restriction, allowing developers to link to outside purchases【47†L239-L244】.
• Apple partially updated U.S. rules in Jan 2024 to comply (linking allowed; 27% fee on external purchases)【53†L160-L168】. Epic filed a new suit alleging Apple’s fees violated the injunction.
• The Ninth Circuit (Apr 24, 2023) largely upheld the district court: antitrust claims failed due to lack of evidence on market and alternatives, but injunctive relief (on anti-steering) stood.
• The Supreme Court denied certiorari (Jan 16, 2024), ending the appeals on the main issues and leaving lower-court rulings intact.
• In April 2025 Judge Rogers found Apple in contempt for imposing the 27% fee. She ordered Apple to stop charging for outside purchases and lifted restrictions on developer links. Apple’s attempt to stay this order failed.
• Worldwide, regulators are forcing similar changes: EU’s DMA compelled sideloading and external payments; the EC launched antitrust probes (Jun 2024 preliminary findings); South Korea and other jurisdictions also mandated alternative app distribution.

Table: Claims, Rulings, and Remedies

Claim/Issue	District Court (2021)	9th Circuit (2023)	Result/Remedy
Epic: Monopoly (Sherman Act §2)	No monopolization: market defined as iOS gaming; Apple faced potential entry	Affirmed: Epic failed to prove a valid market or anti-competitive effect	Apple not deemed monopolist; no damages for Epic
Epic: Tying / Restraint (Sherman Act §1)	No violation: Apple may charge up to 30%; alternative payment evidence insufficient	Affirmed: errors in legal analysis harmless; no tying found	No change: Epic’s Section 1 claim fails
Epic: Anti-steering ban (CA Cartwright/UCL)	Violation: Apple cannot bar developers from linking to external payment options	Affirmed: grant injunctive relief under CA law	Injunction: Apple must allow links/buttons to outside purchases
Epic: Unfair Competition (CA UCL)	Violation (anti-steering rule)	Affirmed UCL injunction in Epic’s favor	Apple’s anti-steering ban struck down
Apple: Epic breach of contract (DPLA)	Epic breached license by introducing own payment system; awarded Apple ~30% of $ (payment collected)	Affirmed breach finding; remanded on attorneys’ fees; Apple entitled to fees under DPLA	Epic must pay Apple 30% of bypass revenue; owe fees (pending)

Table: Timeline of Key Events

Date	Event	References
Aug 13, 2020	Epic’s Fortnite bypass update launches; Apple removes Fortnite and terminates Epic’s dev accounts. Epic sues Apple the same day.	Epic complaint, press releases
Sept 2020	Epic seeks preliminary injunction; Apple countersues.	Court filings
Oct 9, 2020	Preliminary Injunction: Judge denies Fortnite reinstatement but orders Apple not to cut off Epic’s developer tools.	[30] Doc.118 Oct 2020
May 3–24, 2021	Trial takes place in N.D. Cal.; extensive testimony from Apple and Epic executives.	Trial transcripts (YGR, 2021)
Sept 10, 2021	District Ruling (N.D. Cal.): Apple wins 9 of 10 counts. Epic’s Sherman Act claims fail; Apple’s anti-steering rule violates CA law. Injunction issued to allow external links.	[47], [48]
Sept 15, 2021	Ninth Circuit partially stays the injunction (Fortnite stays banned, but development tools preserved).	9th Cir. Order, Sept 15, 2021
Nov 2021–Apr 2022	Discovery & briefing on injunctive relief and appeal stay.	Court dockets
Apr 24, 2023	Ninth Circuit (9th Cir.): Panel affirms district’s judgment (4-3). It upholds denial of antitrust claims and the UCL injunction, but remands fee issue in Apple’s favor.	[48] Opinion, Apr 24, 2023
Sept 29, 2023	Epic files petition for Supreme Court review (No. 23‑337).	SCOTUS docket
Jan 16, 2024	Supreme Court: Denies certiorari (Epic v. Apple, No. 23‑337), leaving 9th Cir. ruling in place【35†L236-L244】. Apple announces U.S. App Store rule changes effective Jan 2024.	[35], Apple statements
Jan 16–31, 2024	Apple updates U.S. App Store rules: Allows external payment links (one per app) with a commission (27% for most, 12% for small developers) on purchases within 7 days【53†L160-L168】.	[53]
Mar 7, 2024	EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) goes into effect (applicable to Apple as a gatekeeper).	EU law (DMA text)
Mar 21, 2024	US DOJ sues Apple: Sherman Act §2 claim in D.N.J., accusing Apple of monopolizing smartphone market【24†L159-L168】.	[24] DOJ press release
Jun 24, 2024	EU antitrust probe: EC issues preliminary finding that Apple’s App Store rules (steering ban, fees) likely violate DMA【22†L100-L109】.	[22] Reuters/EC statement
Apr 30, 2025	Contempt hearing outcome: Judge Rogers rules Apple must stop charging any fee on App Store purchases made via external links and allow unrestricted links【44†L219-L227】.	[44]
June 4, 2025	9th Cir denies stay: Appeals court refuses to pause Rogers’ April order (Apple’s emergency appeal denied)【44†L219-L227】.	[44]

Background: App Store Ecosystem & Epic’s Motives

The iPhone’s App Store (launched 2008) is a classic two-sided market: Apple provides a platform to millions of users and thousands of developers, taking a cut of sales【51†L62-L71】. Apple’s rules have long required in-app purchases use its IAP system and barred developers from informing users about cheaper alternatives. In return, Apple offers security and discovery. Over the years, Apple’s standard commission ranged 15–30%, though it reduced it to 15% for many apps (Small Business Program).

Epic Games, a major game developer (creator of Fortnite), objected. Fortnite was immensely successful (over 350 million registered players by May 2020【42†】). Epic ran its own PC games store at a lower 12% fee, and viewed Apple’s 30% cut as excessive. Epic CEO Tim Sweeney argued the App Store restrictions stifled competition. When Apple refused to lower its fee, Epic engineered an in-app payment option bypassing Apple’s system on August 13, 2020【33†L153-L161】. Apple’s removal of Fortnite ignited the lawsuits.

| Epic’s Perspective: Apple has a locked-up “walled garden” on iOS. By restricting app distribution to the App Store and imposing high fees and anti-steering rules, Apple unlawfully monopolizes mobile gaming and squeezes developers【48†L101-L109】. Epic sought to force Apple to allow alternative payment methods and app stores.
| Apple’s Perspective: Developers agree to Apple’s terms by choice. Apple contends the App Store and its fees are pro-competitive (integrating device and software, ensuring security, innovation). Epic knowingly breached its developer contract (the DPLA) and cannot rewrite Apple’s rules. Apple argues iOS is only one part of a broader smartphone market with many alternatives.

This clash touched on the economics of two-sided markets. Analysts note that Epic v. Apple effectively applied the Ohio v. Amex framework: courts looked at effects on both developers and users, balancing pro- and anticompetitive evidence across the platform【51†L62-L71】. In practice, both the district and appeals courts gave roughly equal consideration to each side, requiring Epic to show it overcame Apple’s efficiency justifications and offered a viable alternative ecosystem.

Legal Claims by Epic and Apple

Epic’s Complaint (Aug 2020) alleged that Apple’s App Store rules violated federal and state law:

• Sherman Act §2 (Monopolization): Apple illegally monopolized the “iOS mobile gaming” market by forbidding non-App Store distribution (100% share) and forcing use of its payment system.
• Sherman Act §1 (Tying/Restraint): Apple illegally tied the sale of apps to use of its 30% IAP system, barring developers from using cheaper alternatives.
• California Cartwright Act & Unfair Competition Law: Apple’s anti-steering rules (banning app links or calls to external purchases) are unfair trade practices.
• Breach of California Unfair Competition Law (UCL): Apple’s conduct was “unlawful, unfair and anticompetitive.”
  Apple countered with a Breach of Contract claim under the Developer Program License Agreement (DPLA), arguing Epic deliberately violated Apple’s terms to provoke litigation.

The District Court bifurcated the case. In 2021, after a bench trial on liability, Judge Rogers made key findings:

• Relevant Market: She defined the market narrowly as iOS mobile gaming. Apple’s share was effectively 100% there, but evidence showed potential competition (e.g. Android, PC games, new console entrants).
• Sherman §2: Epic failed to show monopoly power in the broader iOS market or harm to consumers. Apple’s restrictions had pro-competitive justifications (security, network effects). The court found no illegal monopoly.
• Sherman §1 (Tying): No violation: the evidence favored Apple. The court allowed Apple to keep charging its commission; iOS users weren’t forced to pay higher prices (apps could be free, revenue came from gameplay elements).
• Anti-steering (Cartwright/UCL): Apple lost here. The judge ruled that forbidding developers from informing users of cheaper external options was an unfair business practice under California law. This was the one “win” for Epic.
• Remedies: The court enjoined Apple from enforcing its anti-steering rules nationwide, effectively allowing in-app buttons/links to outside payment sites. Apple’s core 30% commission on in-app purchases remained intact.
• Contract Breach: Apple’s counterclaim succeeded: Epic had breached the DPLA and owed Apple ~30% of the $12 million it collected via the unauthorized payment in Fortnite. However, Epic was not required to pay Apple’s attorneys’ fees.

Table: Epic’s Legal Claims vs. Court Rulings summarizes these outcomes (see above).

Trial Highlights

During the May 2021 trial, both sides presented technical and economic testimony. Epic engineers and executives demonstrated how the App Store ecosystem works and argued that Apple’s rules inflated costs and stifled innovation. Apple’s witnesses (including former Google employees and its own attorneys) defended the safety and efficiency of the App Store model, arguing consumers value convenience and security. Notable moments included:

• Apple’s Phil Schiller (svp marketing) testified it was critical for Apple to maintain “complete control” over iOS apps for privacy/security. Internal Apple debates (revealed later) showed some executives, like Schiller, wanted to comply with Judge Rogers’ order to allow links, but CEO Tim Cook initially resisted.
• Epic’s CEO Tim Sweeney emphasized fairness and alleged anti-competitive intent behind Apple’s policies.
• Judge Rogers, in her post-trial analysis, noted that Apple’s compliance statements were sometimes misleading, setting the stage for her later contempt findings.

Ultimately, the trial showcased deep conflict over platform economics. Apple described the App Store as a single, secure marketplace (likening iOS to a service), whereas Epic likened it to a toll booth on commerce (a classic antitrust grievance). The court’s careful findings on market boundaries and user harm would prove pivotal on appeal.

District Court Decision (Sept 10, 2021)

On Sept 10, 2021, Judge Gonzalez Rogers issued a mixed verdict【47†L205-L213】:

• Apple Wins (Majority of Claims): The judge upheld most App Store rules. Apple could continue to charge its 15–30% commission on in-app sales, and Epic’s requested in-app purchase feature was denied. The court did not force Apple to open iOS to third-party app stores or fully dismantle its payment system. Apple retained the ability to require contracts with developers.
• Apple Loses (One Claim): Apple’s rule prohibiting developers from even mentioning cheaper payment options was declared illegal. The court ordered Apple to allow in-app links and buttons to external purchase pages. This “anti-steering” injunction applied nationwide. Apple can’t stop a developer from saying, e.g., “Buy a subscription on our website cheaper” or from directing users outside the App Store.
• Other Rulings: Epic’s Sherman Act theories were rejected. On market definition, the court agreed with Apple’s narrower view (gaming on iOS). Importantly, Judge Rogers noted that Apple’s market dominance on iOS wasn’t insulated by law – iPhone owners could switch to Android, PlayStation, etc., meaning competition exists. For contract law, the court found Epic in breach and required it to pay Apple roughly 30% of the $12 million it collected (over $3 million), but it denied Apple’s claim to attorneys’ fees.

Quotes from the opinion underline the balanced approach: “Epic Games has failed in its burden to demonstrate Apple is an illegal monopolist”. Meanwhile, the court called Apple’s anti-steering rules “anticompetitive” and “seriously harming consumers”, because they foreclosed important information from users.

The net remedy was limited: Epic was not awarded damages or royalty relief, but gained injunctive relief allowing App Store developers more freedom. This was hailed as a partial victory for competitors and regulators who sought more App Store flexibility. Epic immediately appealed, and Apple sought to overturn the injunction.

Injunctive Relief and Enforcement

The September 2021 injunction took effect immediately and remained in place pending appeals. Apple partially complied: late 2021 it introduced a pilot “reader app” policy and limited link policies in certain markets (e.g. the Netherlands), but the nationwide injunction remained unresolved. Apple did not allow links right away in the U.S., arguing it needed to develop guidelines.

In January 2024 (after SCOTUS denied certiorari), Apple officially updated the U.S. App Store rules. Developers could apply for an “External Purchase Link” entitlement: once granted, an app may include one link to a website where users can pay outside the app. Crucially, Apple still collects a commission on such transactions. Apple set this at 27% for most developers (or 12% if in its Small Business Program) for purchases completed within seven days of the link tap. This policy was intended to implement Judge Rogers’ order while preserving Apple’s revenue.

Epic and its allies cried foul, arguing the 27% fee meant Apple effectively maintained the “Apple tax,” undermining the injunction. Epic quickly moved to hold Apple in contempt, contending Apple violated the court’s order by imposing this fee and narrowly controlling how links can be displayed. In Feb–Apr 2025 the court heard evidence on compliance.

On April 30, 2025, Judge Rogers sided with Epic. She found that by charging 27% on out-of-app purchases, Apple had “circumvented” the injunction’s purpose. Rogers amended her injunction, ordering Apple to stop collecting any commission on purchases made via external links and to drop restrictions on where and how developers place those links. In effect, Apple had “no second bite at the Apple,” to quote Rogers. Tim Sweeney celebrated: “the long nightmare of the Apple tax is ended”.

Apple’s bid to pause this order failed. In June 2025 the Ninth Circuit denied Apple’s emergency request to stay Rogers’ April 2025 injunction【44†L219-L227】. Apple has appealed these developments to higher courts as of early 2026. The outcome will further shape how forcefully a court can mandate changes to platform practices.

Appeals and Supreme Court Action

After the 2021 judgment, Epic and Apple both appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (9th Cir., 2023)【48†L117-L125】, a three-judge panel issued a 2-1 decision on April 24, 2023:

• The majority affirmed Judge Rogers on the core issues. It agreed that Epic’s antitrust evidence was insufficient – in particular, Epic failed to define a lawful market or show a workable alternative to Apple’s model. The panel noted some legal errors (the district court’s market definition and its treatment of the adhesive developer contract), but deemed them “harmless.” In short, Epic still could not establish Sherman Act violations.
• The panel upheld the injunction on Apple’s anti-steering rule under California law, finding the injunction was properly granted. This meant Apple must continue allowing out-of-app links.
• On attorney fees, the Ninth Circuit reversed: it decided the DPLA’s indemnification clause entitled Apple to recover fees from Epic. That issue was remanded for calculation. (Justice Thomas dissented on this point.)

Importantly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision left the injunctive relief intact. It did not relieve Apple of the requirement to permit external links; only the fee issue changed for Epic.

Epic and Apple both sought Supreme Court review. The U.S. Supreme Court invited a response from Apple and held a conference on January 12, 2024. On January 16, 2024, the Court denied certiorari (the petitions in Nos. 23-337, 23A78). This meant all appellate judgments stood as is: Apple could continue restricting payments (30% commission) but had to allow some developer steering via links.

In parallel, Apple had asked the Supreme Court to vacate the injunction entirely; Epic separately filed an emergency application to lift the Ninth Circuit’s stay on injunction enforcement (Docket 23A78). Both were denied by Justice Kagan on August 9, 2023. The upshot: the lower courts’ orders remained in force during further proceedings.

Regulatory and Global Developments

Epic v. Apple had broad influence on global tech regulation. The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), passed in 2022 and effective March 2024, designated iOS and the App Store as “core platform services” (a gatekeeper). Under the DMA, Apple must allow alternative app stores and payment systems in the EU. In fact, on Jan 25, 2024 (before U.S. changes), Apple announced for EU compliance that iOS 17.4 would permit sideloading and third-party app stores, plus alternative in-app payment methods.

Despite compliance, regulators remain wary. On June 24, 2024 the European Commission sent Apple a statement of objections for violating the DMA: specifically, Apple’s App Store steering restrictions and its “Core Technology Fee” (a new charge Apple planned) appeared illegal under EU law. This echoes the Epic case issues in a European context.

Elsewhere, countries are acting. South Korea (2021) and Japan (recently) passed laws forcing platform providers to allow alternative payments. Australia’s code (2021–22) requires deals between Apple and app developers on payments. Even the U.S. Congress has considered legislation (e.g. bipartisan app store competition bills) influenced by this saga.

Most dramatically, on March 21, 2024 the U.S. Department of Justice (with 16 states) sued Apple for monopolizing the smartphone market. The DOJ complaint accuses Apple of using App Store rules (and device limitations) to maintain unlawful profits, echoing Epic’s core claim. It seeks broad remedies and highlights Apple’s vertical integration. This DOJ action is a historic escalation: it could force changes beyond the App Store (e.g. phone repairs, interoperability).

Meanwhile, Epic also sued Google (Nov 2020) over similar issues on Android. In December 2023, a jury found Google illegally maintained an Android monopoly (Epic v. Google, 2:20-cv-05671, ND Cal), echoing the Apple fight.

Industry Impact: The immediate effect of Epic’s U.S. victory is clear: app developers can now communicate cheaper options to users and charge Apple less on outside transactions. Many smaller devs stand to benefit. Indeed, several big tech and app companies backed Epic: Spotify, Match Group, and others filed briefs praising the injunction. Spotify called the court’s link-decision a “victory for developers everywhere”. Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon also supported Epic’s stance in court.

However, Apple still retains control. Apps must still use IAP as the primary system, and Apple still collects substantial commissions on in-app transactions. The balancing act of platform control versus openness is ongoing. Some see the outcome as a narrow win for competition; others argue more regulatory action is needed.

Economic Analysis: Epic v. Apple underscores classic two-sided platform economics. Apple’s App Store ties together iPhone users and app developers. Critics argued Apple’s rules were akin to an “App Store tax.” Defenders said Apple provides value (security, curation) to both sides. The legal debate hinged on whether restricting external payments harmed consumers in an actionable way.

Economists note that because Apple’s platform is so successful on the user side, even small frictions (like extra fees) have major effects on developers’ behavior. The courts essentially required Epic to show that letting external payments would not undermine the iOS ecosystem. The cases indicate courts are split on how strictly to apply antitrust to digital platforms. As one analysis notes, both courts in Epic “considered evidence of effects across both groups on the platform” and did not make the burden any higher than in single-sided markets.

Visual Timeline of Events

timeline
    title Epic Games v. Apple – Key Events
    2020-08-13 : Fortnite adds own payment system; Apple removes Fortnite; Epic sues Apple.
    2020-10-09 : PI denied: Judge refuses to reinstate Fortnite, but preserves Epic’s dev accounts.
    2021-05    : Trial held (N.D. Cal.) – extensive testimony on App Store economics.
    2021-09-10 : District Court rules (YGR): Apple not a monopolist; injunctive relief on anti-steering.
    2023-04-24 : 9th Cir. affirms ruling (mixed): no antitrust violation; injunction upheld.
    2023-09-29 : Epic petitions Supreme Court for review (Nos. 23-337, 23A78).
    2024-01-16 : SCOTUS denies certiorari; Apple announces US guideline changes (external links allowed with fee).
    2024-03-07 : EU’s DMA takes effect – Apple must allow sideloading and alt-payments.
    2024-03-21 : DOJ files Sherman Act suit vs Apple (N.J.).
    2024-06-24 : EU Commission preliminarily finds Apple’s App Store rules violate DMA.
    2025-04-30 : Contempt Order: Judge Rogers enjoins Apple from charging any fee on outside purchases.
    2025-06-04 : 9th Cir. refuses to stay Rogers’ April order.

Long-Term Implications

For Platforms and Developers: Epic Games v. Apple has arguably reshaped the App Store landscape. Developers on iOS gain new flexibility: they can steer users to cheaper options outside the app, reducing Apple’s cut. However, the battle illustrates the limits of antitrust litigation. Apple still charges up to 27% on external purchases (albeit down from 30%), and may try to impose compliance costs (audits, disclosures). Many smaller developers (eligible for 12%) celebrate lower fees and freer communication. But larger competitors maintain IAP to keep users in-app.

For Platforms (Economic Impact): Apple’s App Store remains a two-sided platform, and any weakening of exclusivity can dilute its control. If users can easily buy outside apps, the walled garden softens, potentially reducing Apple’s smartphone lock-in. On the other hand, Apple can point to these changes and argue it has conceded enough, shifting the competition to product features and brand. For the economy of app development, the Epic case and the EU’s DMA signal greater regulatory scrutiny on platform fees. The “Apple tax” may continue to shrink under pressure.

Legal and Policy Implications: This case tests how antitrust law applies to digital platforms. The courts here did not extend antitrust to break up Apple’s store outright, but did carve out space for developer rights via state law. It shows that when legislatures and judges question platform commissions, companies will adapt (as Apple did in 2024). The pending DOJ suit could push even broader changes, possibly requiring alternative app stores or reduced fees. Lawmakers in Washington and Brussels are now emboldened to tighten platform rules (e.g., proposals in Congress, the OECD discussions, and follow-up EU regulations).

Unresolved/Contested Issues: Some questions remain open. The Supreme Court never ruled on many core antitrust issues here, leaving no national precedent on tech platform monopolies beyond state law. Apple continues to contest how to comply (e.g. auditors, contract terms). Epic’s broader arguments (like defining the smartphone market) were not accepted, but could re-emerge in other cases (like the DOJ suit). Also unresolved is whether the 27% fee truly makes external links non-“free access” (Apple argued yes; the court said no). Finally, how these U.S. decisions influence other jurisdictions’ legal standards is an evolving question.

Summary: The Epic v. Apple saga underscores the tug-of-war between platform gatekeepers and challengers. While Apple retains much control of its ecosystem, the legal rulings have chipped away at its exclusivity. Courts have begun enforcing limited openings in the walled garden. Regulators around the world are adding further pressure. For developers and consumers, the landscape will continue evolving: more choices and possibly lower fees are on the horizon, but the full dismantling of the App Store model has not occurred. The case leaves a lasting record on how courts view digital two-sided markets and sets the stage for continued antitrust action in tech.

Last Updated on 2 days ago by pinc